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Coopetition Against an Amazon
Ronen Gradwohl∗ Moshe Tennenholtz†
Abstract
This paper studies cooperative data-sharing between competitors
vying to predict a consumer’s tastes. We design optimal data-sharing
schemes both for when they compete only with each other, and for when
they additionally compete with an Amazon—a company with more,
better data. In both cases we show that participants benefit from such
coopetition. We then apply the insights from our optimal schemes to
more general settings.
1 Introduction
A key challenge faced by e-commerce companies is the presence of Big Tech
companies with vastly greater resources—including data, infrastructure, and
capital—competing in the same market. One way in which smaller firms may
overcome this hurdle and survive or even thrive in such a market is to en-
gage in coopetitive strategies—namely, to cooperate with other small firms
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that are its competitors. Such coopetitive strategies have increasingly be-
come a field of study by both academics and practitioners (see, for exam-
ple Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 2011; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000), but they
largely focus on industrial applications such as healthcare, IT, and service in-
dustries. In this paper, we study coopetition between e-commerce companies,
and focus on the possibility of data sharing as a way to deal with their data
imbalance vis-a`-vis Big Tech. Can e-commerce companies share data with
their competitors for mutual benefit against an Amazon?
For a concrete application, consider retailers in a Long Tail market—a mar-
ket with an enormous number of low-demand goods that collectively make up
substantial market share—interested in finding consumers for their products.
Success in such markets crucially relies on retailers’ abilities to predict con-
sumers’ tastes in order to match them to relevant products (Anderson, 2006).
On their own, smaller companies can be destroyed by giants with vastly greater
amounts of data and thus a clear predictive advantage. In cooperation with
other small companies, however, this data imbalance may be mitigated, pos-
sibly granting smaller companies a fighting chance.
In this paper we study such cooperation between competing companies.
Our main insight is that data sharing is often beneficial to those engaged
in it. We derive this insight in a simple model of consumer-taste prediction,
where we find the optimal schemes of data sharing. More specifically, we study
two settings, one without and the other with an Amazon. In the former, we
show that coopetition is beneficial to the extent that firms can share data to
simultaneously improve their respective predictions. In the latter, we show
that a firm can further improve its welfare by sometimes sharing data with
others and weakening its own market position on some market segment, in
exchange for receiving data from others and strengthening its market position
on other market segments.
The following simple example illustrates our model and results. Consider a
market with two goods, g1 and g2, that consumers may desire. Each consumer
is described by a feature vector in {0, 1} × {0, 1} that determines that con-
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sumer’s taste: Consumers of types 00 and 11 will only purchase g1, whereas
consumers of types 01 and 10 will only purchase g2. A priori, suppose the
distribution of consumers in the market is such that an α fraction are of type
00, a β fraction of type 01, a γ fraction of type 10, and a δ fraction of type 11.
When a consumer shows up to the market, a retailer may offer him one
of the goods. If the retailer has data about the consumer’s type, he will offer
the good desired by that consumer. Assume that when a consumer is offered
the correct good he makes the purchase, and that this leads to a profit of 1
to the retailer. If there are two retailers offering this good to the consumer he
chooses one at random from whom to make the purchase. A retailer whose
good is not chosen gets profit 0.
Suppose now that there are two retailers pursuing the same consumer, but
that they do not fully know the consumer’s type. Instead, the first retailer
only knows the first bit of the consumer’s type, and the second retailer only
knows the second bit. This situation is summarized in Figure 1, where the
first retailer knows the row bit and the second knows the column bit. Which
goods should the competing retailers offer the consumer? For this example,
suppose for simplicity that α > 2β ≥ 2γ > 4δ. Then each of the retailers has
a dominant strategy: If the bit they know is 0, offer g1, and if the bit they
know is 1, offer g2.
To see this, consider for example the row retailer, and suppose he learns
that a consumer’s row bit is 0. He thus knows that the correct good is g1 with
probability α/(α+ β) and g2 with probability β/(α+ β). His utility, however,
depends also on the good offered by the column retailer. The row retailer’s
worst-case utility from offering g1 is α/(2α + 2β), which occurs when the
column player also offers g1. His best case utility from offering g2 is β/(α+β).
Since we assumed α > 2β, offering g1 is optimal for the row player, and is
thus dominant. The analyses for the case in which the row retailer’s bit is 1,
as well as for the column retailer’s strategy, are similar.
The result from deployment of these dominant strategies is that consumers
of type 00 will be offered the correct good by both retailers, and will thus choose
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Figure 1: Data sharing: An example
one at random. Consumers of types 01 and 10 will be offered the correct good
by only one of the retailers, whereas consumers of type 11 will not make a
purchase as they will not be offered the correct good. The expected profit of
the first retailer will thus be α/2 + γ, and of the second retailer α/2 + β.
Does data sharing improve retailers’ profits? Suppose retailers could share
their respective information with one another, so that both always knew the
consumer’s type. This would lead to both always offering the correct good,
and hence to expected profits of 1/2 for each. However, this is detrimental
to the second retailer whenever α/2 + β > 1/2, since he incurs a loss. Such
cooperation is thus not incentive compatible – the second retailer will not want
to cooperate with the first.
Instead, consider the following data-sharing scheme: both retailers share
their data with a mediator,1 who then passes along the data to all retailers
only if the consumer’s type is 11. If the consumer is not of type 11 then each
retailer has his original data, and additionally learns that the consumer’s type
is not 11 (for otherwise he would have learned this from the mediator).
How does this scheme affect retailers’ strategies? Clearly, when retailers
learn that the consumer’s type is 11, both offer g1. What happens if a retailer
does not learn that the consumer’s type is 11? Consider the row retailer. If his
bit is 0, then not learning that the consumer’s type is 11 does not provide any
new information, and so he still has the same dominant strategy of offering
1The mediator may be an impartial third-party (such as an enterprise platform) or a
cryptographic protocol run by the two retailers. Assume for now that retailers may commit
to using this mediator before a consumer shows up.
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g1. If his bit is 1, however, then he learns that the consumer’s type must be
10. But note that in this case, his optimal strategy is to offer g2, which is the
same as his dominant strategy absent a mediator. Thus, the mediator changes
the row retailer’s behavior only when the consumer is of type 11. A similar
analysis and conclusion holds for the column retailer.
Thus, since retailers optimally offer the same goods with and without data
sharing in all cases except when the consumer is of type 11, this scheme changes
retailer’s profits only in this latter case. It thus leads to an additional profit
of δ/2 for each retailer beyond his original profit—with probability δ the con-
sumer is of type 11, in which case the retailer’s split the additional surplus of
1—and is thus beneficial to both. Theorem 1 shows that such a scheme is, in
fact, not only incentive compatible but also optimal.
Suppose now that the two retailers are competing against an Amazon for
the customer. Since the Amazon is a giant it has more data, and in particular
we assume that it has complete information about each consumer’s type. In
this three-way competition, the original dominant strategies of our two smaller
retailers do not perform as well: They lead to profits of α/3+γ/2 and α/3+β/2
to the first and second retailer, respectively, since when they offer the correct
good the consumer now chooses amongst up to 3 retailers. The mediator
described above, which reveals information when the type is 11, leads to higher
profits, since now there is an additional δ/3 to each of the smaller retailers.
However, that mediator is no longer optimal, and the retailers can actually do
better.
To see this, observe that, conditional on consumer type 01, the total profits
to the small retailers is β/2, since only the second makes the correct offer g2
and then competes with the Amazon. In contrast, if both retailers were to
know the type and offer the correct good, then their total profit would be
2β/3, namely β/3 each. This is harmful to the second retailer as it involves
a loss of profit, but a gain for the first and the sum. But the second retailer
can be compensated by getting data from the first elsewhere, for instance on
consumer type 10.
5
For simplicity of this example, suppose that β = γ, and consider a me-
diator that facilitates full information-sharing, in which both retailers learn
each other’s data and thus have complete information about consumers’ types.
Here, the profit of each is 1/3 > α/3+β/2 = α/3+γ/2, so both gain from this
data sharing. Furthermore, the total profit of the retailers is 2/3, which is the
maximal utility they can obtain when competing against an Amazon. Thus,
this data-sharing scheme is incentive compatible and optimal. Observe that it
leads to higher retailer welfare than the optimal scheme absent an Amazon.
Full information-sharing is not always incentive compatible, however. If β
is much greater than γ, then the second retailer is not sufficiently compensated
by the first for sharing data about consumer 01. The second retailer will
consequently be harmed by such data sharing, and so the scheme will not be
incentive compatible. However, in Theorem 2 we show that there is a different
data-sharing scheme that is incentive compatible and optimal, a scheme in
which the first retailer shares all his data and the second shares some of his
data. Overall, we show that such data sharing coopetition against an Amazon
is beneficial to the small retailers.
Our main model is more general than the simple example above, and in-
volves many goods and many types of consumers. For the example it was
useful to think of each consumer as having a feature vector describing his
type, but in the model we take a more general approach that allows for a
wider class of information structures. Finally, in general the retailers will not
have dominant strategies, but will rather be engaged in some Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game. Nonetheless, our main results are constructions of
optimal mediators for coopetitive data-sharing without and with the presence
of an Amazon, that improve upon retailers’ profits relative to their equilibrium
payoffs.
We also consider various extensions to the model, including many small
retailers, stronger notions of incentive compatibility, the possibility of cash
transfers amongst retailers, and even more general information structures. For
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some we derive positive results: For example, when transfers are permitted
then the optimal mediator is always one that involves full information-sharing
(see Section 5.3). For others, we show that our insight persists, although it
may not be optimal. For example, for more general information structures we
show that the mediator we construct for Theorem 1 is incentive compatible and
improves retailers’ profits, although it is not always optimal (see Section 5.4).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First we survey the related
literature, followed by a formal description of the model in Section 2. Sections 3
and 4 then present our main results without an Amazon and with an Amazon,
respectively, including constructions of mediators and theorems proving their
optimality. Finally, Section 5 describes and analyzes extensions to our model,
followed by concluding notes in Section 6.
1.1 Related Literature
Research on coopetition is quite extensive—see Brandenburger and Nalebuff
(2011) for a popular account and Devece et al. (2019) for a recent survey.
Most closely related to our work are studies of coopetitive strategies for small
and medium-sized enterprises. In particular, Bengtsson and Johansson (2014)
study cooperation between small firms and large competitors, and Bouncken and Kraus
(2013) and Park et al. (2014b,a) empirically study the impact of coopetition
amongst smaller firms on innovation.
Our paper is also related to two branches of the literature on informa-
tion sharing, among oligopolists (e.g., Clarke, 1983; Raith, 1996) and in ver-
tical supply chains (e.g., Ha and Tong, 2008; Shamir and Shin, 2016). These
branches largely focus on whether or not full information-sharing is benefi-
cial, and focus on the case in which all participants obtain the same shared
information. As demonstrated by Bergemann and Morris (2013), these foci
potentially limit the benefit of information sharing (see also the survey of
Bergemann and Bonatti, 2019). Our paper differs in that we consider sharing
of information in a more finely-tuned manner, as in the information design
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approach (see below). More substantially, a main novelty of our paper is the
study of such sharing in the presence of an Amazon.
Our work is also related to the rather sizable literature on mediators in
game theoretic contexts, with early works including Aumann (1974) on corre-
lated equilibria and Forges (1986) on communication equilibria. Much of this
literature is concerned with analyzing the set of possible equilibrium outcomes
when there is a mediator rather than on the design of mediators, as is our
focus. Another difference between that line of work and our own is that the
mediator there is often taken for granted, whereas here players must be incen-
tivized to opt into using the mediator. On the other hand, work in this line of
research do not assume that players’ information is honestly reported to the
mediator, as we do.
A related set of papers, which includes Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004,
2009) and Kearns et al. (2014), focuses on designing mediators to achieve var-
ious goals, such as to improve the incentives of players, make equilibria robust
to collusion, or implement correlated equilibria while guaranteeing privacy.
The first two differ from our work in that they make stronger assumptions
about the mediator’s capabilities, such as changing payoffs or limiting player
actions, and the third focuses on a setting with many players that is quite
different from our own.
More broadly, our paper can be viewed as relating to the literature on
Bayesian persuasion and information design more generally (see Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) and Bergemann and Morris (2019), respectively). In that literature a
player, called the Sender, has some information and commits to an information
structure through which he communicates with another player, called the Re-
ceiver. The Receiver then takes an action that influences both players’ payoffs.
In our paper, the small retailers can be seen as Senders who reveal informa-
tion to a mediator, after which the mediator reveals information back to the
retailers, now playing the role of Receivers, via some information structure.
With this comparison, our paper makes similar assumptions about the veri-
fiability of information and the possibility of commitment to the information
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structure. Seen in light of this literature, our model with multiple Senders who
share information with one another and then also act as Receivers is novel.
2 Model and Preliminaries
There is a set G of goods and a population of consumers interested in obtaining
one of them. Each consumer is one of a finite set of types, ω ∈ Ω, that
describe the good gω ∈ G in which he is interested. There are 3 players who
compete for consumers: two regular players indexed 1 and 2, and an Amazon,
a player indexed 0. We will separate the analysis to two settings: first, when
the Amazon player 0 is not present and players 1 and 2 compete only with
one another, and second, when they additionally compete with Amazon. The
model and definitions here apply to both settings.
Player 0 (if present) has complete information of the consumer’s type.
Players 1 and 2 jointly have the information, but each on his own may only
be partially informed. To model this, we represent players’ information using
the information partition model of Aumann (1976): Each player i is endowed
with a partition Πi of Ω, where Πi is a set of disjoint, nonempty sets whose
union is Ω. For each ω ∈ Ω we denote by Pi(ω) the unique element of Πi that
contains ω, with the interpretation that if the realized type of consumer is ω,
each player i only learns that the type belongs to the set Pi(ω).
Framing the example from the introduction within this model would asso-
ciate Ω with {0, 1}2 and the partitions P1(00) = P1(01) = {00, 01}, P1(10) =
P1(11) = {10, 11}, P2(00) = P2(10) = {00, 10}, and P2(01) = P2(11) =
{01, 11}.
In this model, player 0’s complete information means that P0(ω) = {ω}
for all ω ∈ Ω, and players 1 and 2’s jointly-complete information means that
P1(ω) ∩ P2(ω) = {ω} for all ω ∈ Ω.
2 Furthermore, we assume that before
obtaining any information, players share a commonly-known prior belief π
2In Section 5.4 we consider a relaxation of this assumption.
9
over Ω.
To model information sharing between players 1 and 2 we suppose there
is a mediator that gathers each player’s information and shares it with the
other in some way. Formally, a mediator is a functionM : 2Ω×2Ω 7→ ∆(M2),
where M is an arbitrary message space. The range is a distribution over pairs
of messages, where the first (respectively, second) is the message sent to player
1 (respectively, player 2).
We begin with an informal description of the game we have in mind: Players
offer consumers a good, and consumers choose a player from whom to acquire
the good. Consumers are single-minded: For each ω there is a unique gω ∈ G
such that the consumer will only choose a player who offers good gω.
3 If there
is more than one such player, the consumer chooses uniformly at random
between them. We assume that prices and costs are fixed, and normalize a
player’s utility to 1 if he is chosen and to 0 otherwise.
The following is the order of events. These apply for both the case in
which there are only two players {1, 2} and for the case in which there is an
additional Amazon player, indexed 0.
1. Each of players 1 and 2 choose whether or not to opt into using the
mediator.
2. A consumer of type ω is chosen from Ω with prior distribution π.
3. If present, player 0 learns P0(ω).
4. One of the following occurs:
• If one or both players {1, 2} did not opt into using the mediator,
each only learns his respective Pi(ω).
• Otherwise, messages (M1,M2) are chosen from the distribution
M(P1(ω), P2(ω)), and each i ∈ {1, 2} learns Pi(ω) and Mi.
3For one justification of this assumption see Section 4. We consider relaxations of it in
Section 5.4.
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5. Each player simultaneously chooses a good to offer the consumer, and
the consumer chooses a player from whom to obtain the good.
More formally, the players play a Bayesian game Γ(P, G|P|, I, (ui)i∈P , π),
where P is the set of participating players, and is either {1, 2} or {0, 1, 2}. The
function I : Ω 7→ ∆(T |P|) denotes the information of players in the game, with
T being some arbitrary set: In the basic game with the information structure
above, each player i’s information is the partition element of the realized type,
and so I(·)i = Pi(·). This information may be enriched by information sharing
via the mediator, as we describe formally below. Finally, each player’s set of
actions is G, and his utility function ui = ui : Ω×G
|P| 7→ R. The latter is equal
to 0 if player i’s action g 6= gω, and otherwise it is equal to 1/k, where k is the
total number of players who play action gω. The nonzero utility corresponds to
utility 1 if a consumer chooses the player’s good, which occurs if a player offers
the consumer the correct good and the consumer chooses uniformly amongst
all players that do so. Finally, (mixed) strategies of players in Γ are functions
si : T 7→ ∆(G). We also denote by si(ω) = si(Ii(ω)).
As noted above, information sharing is modeled by a mediator M : 2Ω ×
2Ω 7→ ∆(M2), where M is an arbitrary message space. Without loss of gener-
ality we invoke the revelation principle and assume that M = G. We interpret
the messages of the mediator as recommended actions to the players, one rec-
ommendation for each player.
Before playing the game, players 1 and 2 decide whether or not to opt
into participating with the mediator. If at least one declines, players play
the Bayesian game Γ
def
= Γ(P, G|P|, (Pi(·))i∈P , (ui)i∈P , π). If both players 1 and
2 opt into participating with the mediator, they play the mediated game ΓM
def
=
Γ(P, G|P|, IM, (ui)i∈P , π), where I
M(·)0 = P0(·) and I
M(·)i = (Pi(·),M(P1(·), P2(·))i)
for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that in the mediated game each player i ∈ {1, 2}
observes, in addition to his partition element, only the recommended action
intended for him.
An important note about the mediator is in order. We assume that when
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players opt into participating, they truthfully reveal their information Pi(ω) to
him. Their strategic behavior is relevant in their choice of opting in or not, and
then in whether or not they follow the mediator’s recommendation and the
good they offer the consumer. While truthful reporting is clearly a restrictive
assumption, it is reasonable in the context of enterprise platforms acting as
mediators. We view the weakening of this assumption as an orthogonal and
potentially interesting avenue for further research.
Incentive compatibility and optimality In both games Γ and ΓM, player
0 has the unique dominant strategy s0(ω) = gω. We will thus take that player’s
strategy as fixed throughout.
Next, fix some Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) E of Γ: a strategy profile
(s1, s2) that is optimal for each player i conditional on his information and the
assumption that the other player plays his strategy s3−i. Also fix a mediator
M. We will be interested in designing mediators that players actually wish to
utilize, and so would like them to satisfy two requirements: first, that players
want to follow the mediator’s recommendations, and so that following these
recommendations forms an equilibrium; and second, that players prefer their
payoffs with the mediator over their payoffs without it. Formally, we say that
M is incentive compatible (IC) with respect to E if
• the strategy profile s in which players 1 and 2 always followM’s recom-
mendation is a BNE of ΓM, and
• players 1 and 2 both receive (weakly) higher expected utilities under s
in ΓM than under E in Γ.
Note that incentive compatibility is an ex ante notion: Players decide
wether to opt into the mediator before they learn Pi(ω), and if they do then
they are committed. Thus, no player can infer anything about the state from
another player’s decision about whether or not to opt into the mediator. In
Section 5.2 we consider interim incentive compatibility, in which players make
this decision after they learn Pi(ω).
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Note also that, under incentive compatibility, once players receive the me-
diator’s recommendation, it is in their best interest to follow that recommen-
dation.
Finally, as we are interested in the extent to which information sharing
benefits players 1 and 2, we will study optimalmediators, namely ones in which
the sum of these two players’ utilities is maximal subject to IC constraints.
To this end, denote by W (M) the sum of players 1 and 2’s expected utilities
under s in ΓM. Then:
Definition 1 MediatorM is optimal with respect to E if it is IC with respect
to E, and if W (M) ≥ W (M′) for any other M′ that is also IC with respect
to E.
Note that optimality also requires incentive compatibility, and that it is defined
with respect to all other mediators that are also IC.
3 Coopetition Without an Amazon
In this section we analyze the game without an Amazon, in which there are
only two competing players, 1 and 2. Our main result is the construction of
an optimal, incentive compatible mediator. The idea is straightforward: if in
some equilibrium E of the unmediated game there is a consumer ω who, with
positive probability, is not offered the good gω, the mediator shares information
with both players so that both offer the consumer that good. We show that
such a mediator is optimal.
Fix the set of players in Γ to be P = {1, 2}, and consider the following me-
diator, MEnoA. In words, the mediator determines the realized state from both
players’ partition elements, then simulates a draw from the equilibrium profile,
and, if neither player’s realized draw is the correct good gω, recommends this
correct good to both.
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Algorithm 1 Mediator for P = {1, 2} given equilibrium E = (s1, s2)
1: procedure MEnoA(S, T ) ⊲ S = P1(ω) and T = P2(ω) for realized ω ∈ Ω
2: ω ← S ∩ T
3: g1 ← a draw from distribution s1(ω)
4: g2 ← a draw from distribution s2(ω)
5: if (g1 6= gω) ∩ (g2 6= gω) then return (gω, gω)
6: else return (g1, g2)
Theorem 1 For any equilibrium E of Γ, the mediator MEnoA above is optimal
with respect to E.
Proof: Recall that s is the strategy profile in which players 1 and 2 always
follow MEnoA’s recommendation. We first show that players 1 and 2 both re-
ceive (weakly) higher expected utilities under s than under E in Γ. Consider
some ω ∈ Ω, and some realizations (g1, g2) of (s1(ω), s2(ω)). Consider two
events: If (g1 6= gω)∩ (g2 6= gω) then without the mediator, both players would
obtain utility zero. The mediator here recommends gω to both, leading to
positive utility to both players. Conditional on this event, then, the mediator
is beneficial to both. The other event is the complement of this first event,
in which case the mediator recommends players’ NE actions. Since the medi-
ator’s recommendation does not change players’ actions relative to E, it also
does not affect their utilities. Overall, then, both players prefer s in MEnoA to
E.
Next, we show that s is a BNE of ΓM
E
noA. Fix ω and a player i, and suppose
player j = 3 − i plays sj. To simplify notation, denote by M = M
E
noA and
by M(ω)i the distribution over recommendations to player i in state ω. Also
fix some g ∈ supp(si(ω)), and let α = Pr [(si(ω) 6= g)|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g)].
Then when the mediator recommends action g, player i’s expected utility from
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following that recommendation is
E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g)]
= αE [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g) ∩ (si(ω) 6= g)]
+ (1− α)E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g) ∩ (si(ω) = g)] (1)
= α/2 + (1− α)E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g) ∩ (si(ω) = g)] (2)
= α/2 + (1− α)E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g) ∩ (si(ω) = g)] (3)
= α/2 +
1− α
Pr [M(ω)i = g|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
·
(
E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
− E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i 6= g) ∩ (si(ω) = g)] · Pr [M(ω)i 6= g|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
)
(4)
= α/2 +
(1− α) · (E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
Pr [M(ω)i = g|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
, (5)
where (1) follows from the law of total expectation, (2) follows since si(ω) 6=
M(ω)i implies that the mediator recommended gω to both players, (3) follows
since si(ω) =M(ω)i implies that the mediator recommended the equilibrium
action to both players, (4) follows from another application of the law of total
expectation, and (5) follows since M(ω)i 6= g = si(ω) implies that g 6= gω.
Similarly, i’s expected utility from not following the mediator’s recommen-
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dation g and playing g′ 6= g instead is
E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g)]
= αE [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g) ∩ (si(ω) 6= g)]
+ (1− α)E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
= (1− α)E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
= (1− α)E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
=
1− α
Pr [M(ω)i = g|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
·
(
E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
− E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i 6= g) ∩ (si(ω) = g)] · Pr [M(ω)i 6= g|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
)
≤
(1− α) · (E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
Pr [M(ω)i = g|Pi(ω) ∩ (si(ω) = g)]
.
Since E is an equilibrium, it holds that
E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ si(ω) = g)] ≥ E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ si(ω) = g)] ,
and so
E [ui(g, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g)] ≥ E [ui(g
′, sj(ω))|Pi(ω) ∩ (M(ω)i = g)] .
Additionally, note that if M(ω)i = g for some g 6∈ supp(si(ω)) then player
i is certain that g = gω, and so following the mediator’s recommendation is
optimal. Thus, in both cases, following the mediator’s recommendation is op-
timal, and so s is a BNE.
Finally, we show that MEnoA is optimal with respect to E. In any state
ω, the sum of players’ utilities conditional on that state is at most 1. This
maximal utility is achieved whenever at least one player plays gω. Under
MEnoA, at least one player plays gω in every ω. Hence, the sum of players’
(unconditional) expected utilities is W (MEnoA) = 1, the maximum possible in
the game.
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4 Coopetition Against an Amazon
In this section we analyze the game with an Amazon. We begin with the
observation that mediator MEnoA described by Algorithm 1 is IC here as well,
and that if line 6 of the algorithm is activated then the mediator improves
upon E for both players 1 and 2. The proof that this mediator is IC in
the presence of an Amazon is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 1,
with one change: the α/2 term in the utility from following the mediator’s
recommendation is replaced by α/3. This change is necessary, since when
the mediator recommends g = gω to both players, they split the profit also
with Amazon, and so each obtains only 1/3. The optimality of following the
mediator’s recommendation remains unchanged.
However, as demonstrated by the example in the introduction, this medi-
ator is not optimal in the presence of an Amazon. The reason is that total
surplus can be improved even in cases in which one of the players offers the
correct good, by providing information to the other player to do the same. The
challenge is to do this in a way that maintains incentive compatibility. The
main result of this section is the construction of a mediator that does exactly
that, and is an optimal mediator for coopetition against an Amazon.
We begin with a definition.
Definition 2 A mediator M is fully-revealing to player i if the mediator’s
recommendation to player i always coincides with the optimal good: si(ω) =
gω. A mediator facilitates full information-sharing if it is fully-revealing to all
players P \ {0}.
In the following, fix the set of players in Γ to be P = {0, 1, 2}, and fix an
equilibrium E of Γ. Let (v1, v2) denote the expected utilities of players 1 and
2 under E in Γ.
Before describing the mediator for coopetition against an Amazon we need
some additional notation. Consider the strategy s′j of player j that, for every
Pj(ω), chooses one of the goods that is most likely to be correct: s
′
j(ω) ∈
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argmaxg∈G Pr[g = gω|Pj(ω)]. Let αj be the overall probability that s
′
j chooses
the correct good: αj = Pr
[
s′j(ω) = gω
]
.
The idea underlying the mediator we construct is the following. Suppose
vi ≥ vj . Then if vi ≤ 1/3, then the mediator will facilitate full information-
sharing, and so each each will offer the correct good in every state. If vi > 1/3
then player i will obtain all the information and player j will obtain only
partial information: he will get recommendation gω with probability less than
1, and otherwise will get recommendation s′j(ω). The challenge is to maximize
the probability of recommendation gω subject to the IC constraints, and to do
this in such a way that following the recommendations is a BNE.
We now formally describe the mediator, and then show that it is indeed
optimal with respect to E.
Algorithm 2 Mediator for P = {0, 1, 2} given equilibrium E
1: procedure MEA(S, T ) ⊲ S = P1(ω) and T = P2(ω) for realized ω ∈ Ω
2: ω ← S ∩ T
3: i← argmaxk∈{1,2} vk
4: j ← 3− i
5: if vi ≤ 1/3 then return (gω, gω) ⊲ Full information sharing
6: else
7: gj ← s
′
j(ω)
8: Choose γ ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random.
9: if γ <
3−6vi−αj
1−αj
then
10: return (gω, gω)
11: else if i = 1 then return (gω, gj)
12: else return (gj, gω)
Theorem 2 For any equilibrium E of Γ, the mediator MEA above is optimal
with respect to E.
An interesting feature of MEA is that it either facilitates full information-
sharing, or is fully-revealing to one of the players. The following theorem
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states that this feature is inherent in any optimal mediator:
Theorem 3 For any equilibrium E of Γ and any mediator M that is optimal
with respect to E, one of the following holds:
• M is fully-revealing to both players 1 and 2.
• M is fully-revealing to one of the players, and the IC constraint binds
for that player (i.e., he is indifferent between M and E).
Before proving the two theorems we develop some notation and intuition.
Fix an equilibrium E = (s1, s2) of Γ yielding utilities (v1, v2), and players i and
j = 3 − i. For any mediator M let βMi = Pr [(M(ω)i = gω) ∩ (M(ω)j 6= gω)]
and βM = Pr [M(ω)i =M(ω)j = gω].
With this notation, the expected utility of player i under s in ΓM is βMi /2+
βM/3: For any ω, if i offers gω and j does not, then the consumer chooses
between players i and 0, and so each gets 1/2. If both i and j offer gω, the
consumer chooses between players i, j, and 0, and so each gets 1/3.
An incentive compatible mediator M is one for which s is a BNE, and
in which βMi /2 + β
M/3 ≥ vi for both players. In addition to the incentive
constraints, we also have the constraints βMi + β
M
j + β
M ≤ 1, and all three
variables non-negative.
Finally, the total welfare of players 1 and 2 in M is W (M) = (βM1 +
βM2 )/2 + 2β
M/3, and so an optimal mediator is one that maximizes this sum
subject to the IC constraints above and subject to s being a BNE. Denote the
linear program above, disregarding the BNE requirement, as LP(v1, v2):
maximize β1+β2
2
+ 2β
3
subject to βi
2
+ β
3
≥ vi, i = 1, 2
βi≥ 0, i = 1, 2
β≥ 0
β1 + β2 + β≤ 1
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Our approach to showing that the mediator above is optimal is to show that
the value of an optimal solution to the linear program LP(v1, v2) is W (M
E
A),
and that the strategy s in MEA is a BNE. We begin with some lemmas that
characterize the optimal solution to LP(v1, v2):
Lemma 1 Suppose vi ≥ vj. Then any optimal solution (β1, β2, β) to LP(v1, v2)
satisfies:
(a) β1 + β2 + β = 1.
(b) βj = 0.
(c) If vi > 1/3 then i’s IC constraint binds: βi/2 + β/3 = vi.
Proof: Suppose (a) does not hold, and that β1+β2+β < 1. This means we
can increase β to β ′ > β without violating any of the constraints. The value
of the LP is now (β1 + β2)/2 + 2β
′/3 > (β1 + β2)/2 + 2β/3, contradicting the
optimality (β1, β2, β).
Now suppose (a) holds, but (b) does not. If βi < βj then vi < vj, a
contradiction. So assume βi ≥ βj . Consider now the solution β
′
i = βi − βj ,
β ′j = 0, and β
′ = β + 2βj. Since
β ′i/2 + β
′/3 = (βi − βj)/2 + (β + 2βj)/3 > βi/2 + β/3 ≥ vi
and
β ′j/2 + β
′/3 = (β + 2βj)/3 > βj/2 + β/3 ≥ vj,
this new solution is feasible. Moreover,
(β ′1 + β2)/2 + 2β
′/3 > (β1 + β2)/2 + 2β/3,
contradicting the optimality of (β1, β2, β).
Now suppose (a) and (b) hold, but that (c) does not. Then there is some
ε > 0 such that β ′i/2 + β
′/3 > vi, where β
′
i = βi − ε and β
′ = β + ε, and so
(β ′1, β
′
2, β
′) is also a feasible solution. Furthermore,
β ′i/2 + 2β
′/3 > βi/2 + 2β/3,
contradicting the optimality of (β1, β2, β).
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One implication of Lemma 1 is that at an optimal solution, β is maximized.
This follows from the observation that the objective function is (β1+β2+β)/2+
β/6 = 1/2 + β/6 when β1 + β2 + β = 1. In addition, Lemma 1 pins down the
value of the optimal solution to LP(v1, v2):
Lemma 2 Fix some vi ≥ vj. Then the value opt(v1, v2) of an optimal solution
to LP(v1, v2) is one of the following:
• If vi ≤ 1/3 then opt(v1, v2) = 2/3.
• If vi > 1/3 then opt(v1, v2) = 1− vi.
Proof: Lemma 1 implies that at the optimal solution we have βi + β = 1,
and so the value at the optimum is βi/2+ 2β/3. In the first case, the optimal
solution occurs at the point β1 = β2 = 0, β = 1: it maximizes the objective,
while both IC constraints remain slack since vi ≤ 1/3 = β/3.
In the second case, Lemma 1 implies that βi/2 + β/3 = vi and that βi =
1 − β. These imply that vi = (1 − β)/2 + β/3, and so that β = 3 − 6vi and
βi = 1− 3 + 6vi. Plugging these into the objective yields
opt(v1, v2) =
βi
2
+
2β
3
=
1− 3 + 6vi
2
+
2(3− 6vi)
3
= 1− vi.
Let us now return to the game Γ and the mediator MEA. To show that
the mediator is optimal we will consider the following hypothetical situation:
suppose player i obtains additional information, and in each state ω he fully
learns that the state is ω, and so he plays the dominant strategy sˆi(ω) = gω.
In this new game, observe that there is an equilibrium (sˆi, s
′
j), where s
′
j is
the strategy that, for every Pj(ω), chooses some g that is most-likely correct
conditional on Pj(ω). Also observe that here, player j is never the only player
to choose gω, since player i always plays gω.
Player j is worse off in this hypothetical game:
Lemma 3 E[uj(s
′
j , sˆi)] ≤ E[uj(sj , si)].
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Proof: Fix a particular state ω. For every action g of player j, who conditions
on Pj(ω), the utility E[uj(g, sˆi)|Pj(ω)] ≤ E[uj(g, si)|Pj(ω)], since i makes cor-
rect choices more often in the former. This implies that E[uj(s
′
j , sˆi)|Pj(ω)] ≤
E[uj(sj , si)|Pj(ω)], since in both sides of the inequality j chooses an optimal
action conditional on his information, but in the RHS the utility from every
choice g is lower than in the LHS. This implies that E[uj(s
′
j , sˆi)] ≤ E[uj(sj, si)].
Although in the hypothetical game player j is worse off, the sum of players’
utilities is higher:
Lemma 4 The sum of players’ utilities in Γ is higher under (s′j, sˆi) than under
(sj, si).
Proof: Again, we show that this holds conditional on every Pj(ω). Fix ω,
and observe that
Pr [sˆi(ω) = sj(ω) = gω|Pj(ω)] ≥ Pr [si(ω) = sj(ω) = gω|Pj(ω)] ,
Since sˆi always correctly chooses gω. Furthermore,
Pr
[
sˆi(ω) = s
′
j(ω) = gω|Pj(ω)
]
≥ Pr [sˆi(ω) = sj(ω) = gω|Pj(ω)] ,
since s′j chooses the good that maximizes the probability of choosing gω. Thus,
Pr
[
sˆi(ω) = s
′
j(ω) = gω|Pj(ω)
]
≥ Pr [si(ω) = sj(ω) = gω|Pj(ω)] .
Now recall that LP(v1, v2) is maximized when β, the probability that both
players correctly choose gω is maximized. Thus, the value of LP(v1, v2), the
sum of players’ utilities, is higher under (s′j, sˆi) than under (s1, s2).
We need one last lemma before proving Theorems 2 and 3:
Lemma 5 Suppose vi > 1/3. Then αj = Pr
[
s′j(ω) = gω
]
≤ 3− 6vi.
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Proof: We first argue that E[ui(sˆi, s
′
j)] ≥ vi. This is straightforward for
the case in which s′j = sj , since i only gains from the additional information
and so makes correct choices more often. Of course, the challenge is that, in
general, s′j 6= sj.
By Lemma 3, E[uj(s
′
j, sˆi)] ≤ E[uj(sj, si)]. By Lemma 4, the sum of players’
utilities under (s′j , sˆi) is higher than under (sj, si). Putting those two facts
together implies that E[ui(s
′
j, sˆi)] ≥ E[ui(sj, si)]. Since E[ui(sj , si)] ≥ vi, this
implies that E[ui(s
′
j , sˆi)] ≥ vi.
Now, note that E[ui(s
′
j , sˆi)] = αj/3+ (1−αj)/2. Together with the above,
this implies that αj ≤ 3− 6vi, as claimed.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: First, consider the case in which vi ≤ 1/3. In this
case, strategy s in ΓM
E
A leads to expected utility 1/3 to each player, which
satisfies the IC constraint and is optimal by Lemma 2. Strategy s is also a
BNE, since each player always chooses gω, which is dominant.
Next, suppose vi > 1/3. Observe that s in Γ
ME
A is dominant for player i,
since he always chooses gω. It is also optimal for player j, since he either also
chooses gω, or chooses the best response conditional on his information Pj(ω).
It remains to show that MEA is optimal. For simplicity, henceforth denote
by M = MEA. First note that β
M
j = 0. Next, by Lemma 5, it holds that
αj ≤ 3−6vi. Since vi ∈ (1/3, 1/2], this implies that αj ∈ [0, 1). These, in turn
imply that
3− 6vi − αj
1− αj
∈ [0, 1],
so line 9 of Algorithm 2 is valid. From that line we have that
βM = αj + (1− αj) ·
3− 6vi − αj
1− αj
= 3− 6vi,
since both players choose gω when s
′
j(ω) = gω and when s
′
j(ω) 6= gω but
γ < (3− 6vi − αj)/(1− αj). This means that
W (M) =
βMi
2
+
2βM
3
=
1− 3 + 6vi
2
+
2(3− 6vi)
3
= 1− vi,
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which, by Lemma 2, is the value of the optimal solution to LP(v1, v2).
Finally, we can also prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose first that E is such that vj ≤ vi ≤ 1/3.
In this case, full information-sharing is IC, and so any optimal mediator M
must have W (M) ≥ 2/3. However, the maximum value of LP(v1, v2) is 2/3,
and the only way to obtain this is to have βM = 1. This is equivalent to
full information-sharing, and so the only mediator that is optimal is the full
information-sharing one.
Now suppose that vi > 1/3. By the proof of Theorem 2, an optimal solution
to LP(v1, v2) is attainable by some mediator, in particular by M
E
A. Thus, any
mediatorM that is optimal must also yieldW (M) that is equal to the optimal
value of LP(v1, v2). By Lemma 1, any optimal solution to LP(v1, v2) must have
βj = 0 and βi/2+β/3 = vi. Thus, the mediator M must satisfy these as well:
the first equality implying thatM is fully-revealing to player i, and the second
that player i’s IC constraint binds.
5 Extensions
5.1 Many Players
In the main model of the paper we analyzed the case of 2 players and possibly
an Amazon. In this section we discuss an extension of the model and results
to n > 2 players. As above, each player i obtains information Pi(ω) in state
ω, and again we assume that, for every ω ∈ Ω, players have jointly-complete
information:
⋂
i∈{1,...,n} Pi(ω) = {ω}.
The main take-away from this section is that in coopetition without an
Amazon, the straightforward generalization of MEnoA to n players is optimal.
In coopetition against an Amazon, however, the situation is more complicated.
We will provide necessary and sufficient conditions for full information-sharing
to be optimal in this case.
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5.1.1 Many Players Without Amazon
Suppose that the set of players is P = {1, . . . , n}, and fix an equilibrium
E. Consider the mediator of Algorithm 1, with the modifications that gi ←
a draw from distribution si(ω) for every i ∈ P, and that the condition on
line 5 is replaced by (gi 6= gω ∀i ∈ P). It is straightforward to argue that a
theorem analogous to Theorem 1 holds here as well, essentially with the same
proof. The only modification is that the α/2 term in the utility from following
the mediator’s recommendation is now α/n, since the added surplus is split
amongst all n players.
5.1.2 Many Players Against Amazon
Suppose now that the set of players is P = {0, 1, . . . , n}, and fix some equi-
librium E of the corresponding game Γ. Let vi denote the expected utility of
player i under E in Γ. Then:
Claim 1 The mediator M that is fully-revealing to all players {1, . . . , n} is
optimal with respect to E if and only if vi ≤ 1/(n+ 1) for all such i.
Proof: The strategy s in a fully-revealing M is a BNE, since each player
plays gω, which is dominant. It is IC with respect to E, since each player i’s
expected utility in M is 1/(n + 1) ≥ vi. Finally, it is optimal with respect
to E: Whenever k players correctly choose gω, the sum of players’ utilities is
k/(k + 1). Under M, the sum of players’ utilities is n/(n + 1), which is the
most they can jointly obtain.
Finally, the reverse direction holds by the observation that if a player has
utility vi > 1/(n+1) then his IC constraint is violated under a fully-revealing
mediator.
5.2 Ex Ante Versus Interim IC
Our notion of incentive compatibility thus far has been an ex ante notion, in
that players choose whether or not to opt into the mediator before the state ω
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is realized. A stronger notion is interim IC with respect to E, which requires
that, in addition to the BNE requirement, players receive (weakly) higher
expected utilities under s in ΓM than under E in Γ for every Pi(ω). In other
words, the order of events is changed: first the state ω is realized, each player
i receives information Pi(ω), and only then do the players choose whether or
not to opt into participating with the mediator.
Clearly, if M is interim IC, then it is also (ex ante) IC. But do our media-
tors satisfy the stronger requirement? First, observe that the mediator MEnoA
without an Amazon is interim IC: For any Pi(ω), without the mediator a
player obtains E[ui(si(ω), sj(ω)|Pi(ω)], whereas with the mediator he obtains
additional utility
Pr[(si(ω) 6=ω) ∩ (sj(ω) 6= gω)|Pi(ω)]
2
,
and so is (weakly) better off.
Mediator MEA against an Amazon, however, is not interim IC. To see this,
notice that the state ω may be such that only one player correctly chooses gω,
and even that he always chooses correctly. In this case his utility, conditional
on Pi(ω), will be 1/2. Under M
E
A, however, the other player may also choose
gω, lowering i’s utility.
5.3 Transfers
An additional extension one might consider is the possibility of monetary trans-
fers between players. For example, the mediator may require one player to pay
an amount c, and another to receive that amount c, when opting in. Assume
total utilities are quasi-linear in these transfers—that is, a player’s total utility
is his utility from the game plus the change is his monetary position. How do
such transfers affect the optimality of mediators?
A first observation is that the optimality of mediator MEnoA without an
Amazon is not affected, since that mediator leads to a globally optimal sum
of player’s utilities. Any transfers will only change the distribution of utilities,
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not their sum.
The set of optimal mediators against an Amazon, however, may be affected.
In particular, when there are transfers, then in an optimal mediator with
respect to any E there will be full information-sharing. Since the maximal
sum of utilities is achieved under full information-sharing, there is always some
transfer that can be instituted that will satisfy all players’ IC constraints.
Furthermore, if transfers can be done at the interim stage—after players
each obtain their information Pi(ω)—then there is a transfer scheme for which
the fully-revealing mediator also satisfies interim IC: For each realization ω, if
player i would be worse off (and so j better off) by full information-sharing
conditional on their respective information, then j compensates i with a trans-
fer. Since the sum of utilities is maximal under full information-sharing, there
is always a transfer that leaves both better off than without the mediator.
5.4 Partially-Informed Players
Our model and analysis assumed that players 1 and 2 have jointly-complete
information about the consumer’s type. In this section we discuss the chal-
lenges created by relaxing this assumption, and argue that a modification of
mediator MEnoA can be beneficial to players 1 and 2, albeit not necessarily op-
timal. Throughout this section, suppose that the joint information of players
1 and 2 may be a non-singleton subset of Ω. That is, there exists some ω ∈ Ω
for which |P1(ω) ∩ P2(ω)| > 1.
We begin with the case in which there is no Amazon, but later argue that
this mediator also works when there is an Amazon. To describe the mediator
we need some notation: For a given ω, let g1ω be the good that is most likely
correct conditional on P1(ω)∩P2(ω), and let g
2
ω be the second most-likely good
(with g2ω = g
1
ω if P1(ω) ∩ P2(ω) is a singleton). Consider the mediator Mˆ
E
noA,
which is the same asMEnoA except for the following modification: Replace line
5 of Algorithm 1 with:
if gi 6∈ supp (P1(ω) ∩ P2(ω)) ∀i ∈ {1, 2} then return (g
1
ω, g
2
ω)
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(Alternatively, the mediator could return (g2ω, g
1
ω) or a distribution over (g
1
ω, g
2
ω)
and (g2ω, g
1
ω). The only difference between these choices is how the surplus is
split between the two players.)
If there is a state ω in which line 5 is activated, the modified mediator leads
to higher utility than equilibrium E with no mediator. Furthermore, a proof
similar to that of Theorem 1 shows that this mediator is IC with respect to E.
It is not, however, always optimal: In particular, it is possible that for some
ω both players choose a good that does lie in supp (P1(ω) ∩ P2(ω)), but that
the probability that this is the correct good is very small, and neither is equal
to g1ω. Perhaps making a different recommendation, to a more-likely-correct
good, will lead to higher utility?
While this is possible, the following example shows that this may lead to
a mediator that is no longer a BNE. For illustration, fix a mediator that, for
each subset Pi(ω)∩Pj(ω), recommends to player i the most-likely-correct good
g1ω.
Example 1 Suppose G = {g1, g2, g3, g4}, and that for some ω and ω
′ we have
Pi(ω) = (Pi(ω) ∩ Pj(ω
′)) ∪ (Pi(ω) ∩ Pj(ω)). Denote by A = Pi(ω) ∩ Pj(ω
′)
and B = Pi(ω) ∩ Pj(ω), and suppose that the prior on Ω is such that Pr[A] =
Pr[B]. Finally, suppose that neither A nor B are singletons: The correct
good conditional on A is g1 with probability 3/5 and g2 with probability 2/5,
and conditional on B it is g2 with probability 2/5 and g3 with probability 3/5.
Finally, suppose the equilibrium E is such that player j chooses g4 in both
Pj(ω) and Pj(ω
′). Conditional on obtaining information Pi(ω), the equilibrium
choice for player i is thus g2.
Suppose players opt into using the mediator. If state ω were realized, then
the mediator would learn that the state lies in B, and so would recommend
good g3 to player i. However, conditional on not receiving recommendation g3,
player i would infer that the state must lie in A, and so his best action would be
g1. In other words, when the mediator makes a recommendation that is equal
to player i’s equilibrium action g2 (in particular, not g3), player i still prefers
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to deviate to g1, and so following this mediator is not a BNE. This possible
deviation may have further implications to player j, who may no longer wish
to play his own equilibrium action g4 conditional on Pj(ω
′), and so on.
One way to avoid this problem is for the mediator to recommend the better
good g3 with probability less than 1, and recommend the equilibrium actions
with the remaining probability. In the example, for instance, if the mediator
recommends g3 with probability 1/2, then when the mediator recommends the
equilibrium action g2, good g2 is indeed a best response conditional on this
recommendation, and hence following the mediator is a BNE. However, the
optimal way to do this across different ω’s is not obvious, and we leave a more
complete analysis of this case for future work.
Next, consider the case in which there is an Amazon. Just like MEnoA is
IC for the case analyzed in Section 4, the mediator MˆEnoA is IC when there is
an Amazon and the other players do not have jointly-complete information.
Similarly to above, in addition to being IC the mediator MˆEnoA improves upon
players’ utilities relative to their equilibrium payoffs, but is not optimal.
One additional wrinkle in the case with an Amazon is that we can further
optimize the sum of utilities. To do so, let αkω = Pr[g
k
ω|P1(ω)∩P2(ω)] for each
k ∈ {1, 2}. Then replace line 5 of Algorithm 1 with the following:
if gi 6∈ supp (P1(ω) ∩ P2(ω)) ∀i ∈ {1, 2} then
if
2 · α1ω
3
≥
α1ω + α
2
ω
2
then return (g1ω, g
1
ω)
else return (g1ω, g
2
ω)
With this optimization, when neither of g1 or g2 are in the support of
P1(ω)∩P2(ω), the mediator recommends either (g
1
ω, g
1
ω), which leads to utility
α1ω/3 for each player, or (g
1
ω, g
2
ω), which leads to utility α
1
ω/2 to the first player
and utility α2ω/2 to the second player. The recommendation is chosen so as to
maximize the sum of players’ utilities.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a simple model to study coopetitive data sharing
between companies. We designed two data-sharing schemes, in the form of
mediators, that are optimal in their respective domains: the first when the
players compete with each other only, and the second when they also compete
against a giant company with more data. We also argued that our insights
can be used to inform the design of data-sharing schemes for more general
settings.
Coopetitive data sharing is crucial for companies’ survival in current on-
line markets, and the model and results of this paper have only scratched the
surface of what can and should be done. In particular, the paper leaves numer-
ous problems and directions open for future research. For example, while our
insights apply to many of the extensions to the basic model described in Sec-
tion 5, we have yet to derive optimal mediators for all of them. In particular,
what is the optimal mediator against an Amazon when there are many play-
ers? What is the optimal mediator when players do not have jointly-complete
information? And what is the optimal mediator satisfying interim incentive
compatibility?
A more challenging open problem is to find optimal mediators when Ama-
zon also does not have complete information, or when consumers may be
interested in more than one good with different profits to the retailers. The
added difficulty here is that Amazon no longer has a dominant strategy, and
so any mediator must also take into account the effect it has on Amazon’s
strategy.
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